The Big Scam: How BDS is Manipulating Social Media Against Eurovision 2019
Table of Contents

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................................................... 3

II. METHODOLOGY....................................................................................................................................... 7

   a. DEFINITIONS......................................................................................................................................... 7

   b. RESEARCH METHODS............................................................................................................................. 8

III. THE FINDINGS......................................................................................................................................... 10

   a. GENERAL............................................................................................................................................... 10

   b. THE TARGETED ARENAS......................................................................................................................... 11

      i. THE PALESTINIAN ACADEMIC AND CULTURAL BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL (PACBI) – THE INSTIGATOR OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE EUROVISION SONG CONTEST ........................................................................................................................................... 12

      ii. THE SPREAD OF THE CAMPAIGN TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND BDS ORGANIZATIONS ........................................................................................................................................................................ 13

      iii. THE TWITTER STORMS OF #GROUPPALESTINE............................................................................. 15

   c. EXAMPLES OF THE DECEPTION CAMPAIGN TO PRESSURE PUBLIC BROADCASTERS AND ARTISTS PARTICIPATING IN THE EUROVISION SONG CONTEST ......................................................................................................................... 22

IV. APPENDIX A - #GROUPPALESTINE – ADDITIONAL INFORMATION......................................................... 27

V. APPENDIX B - TWITTER STORMS........................................................................................................... 33

VI. APPENDIX C - BOTS- AN IN-DEPTH LOOK........................................................................................... 41

VII. APPENDIX D - THE PALESTINIAN ACADEMIC AND CULTURAL BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL (PACBI) – ORIGINATOR OF THE BOYCOTT AGAINST THE EUROVISION .................................................................................................................... 48
I. Executive Summary

1. Over the last several months a vast social media influence campaign has been underway calling for the boycott of the Eurovision Song Contest, which will take place in Tel Aviv, Israel in May 2019. The campaign began shortly after Neta Barzilai won the 2018 Eurovision Song Contest, under the hashtag #BoycottEurovision2019, and is gaining momentum as this year's contest approaches.

2. The influence campaign is led by PACBI, the Palestinian Campaign for Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel, a Ramallah based Palestinian organization founded in 2004, which promotes the boycott of Israel in the cultural and academic arena. PACBI is an arm of the BNC, the Palestinian BDS National Committee, which leads the global boycott campaign against Israel. The BNC is comprised of member organizations, foremost amongst them is the Palestinian National Islamic Forces (PNIF), a group consisting of Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad - all designated terrorist organizations in the US, Europe and Israel. In December 2018, the BNC’s fundraising platform in the United States was shut down due to its links with these terrorist organizations.

3. Beginning in November 2018, the Ministry of Strategic Affairs and Public Diplomacy has conducted an in-depth examination of the social media influence campaign to boycott the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest, held in Israel. The examination revealed clear data indicating the use of a number of schemes utilizing deceptive methods - including bots, trolls, and fake accounts. These were exposed, among other things, on the basis of what is referred to as "coordinated inauthentic behavior" targeting large audiences around the world. This report will focus specifically on the findings of the deception campaign on Twitter.

4. As of April 11, 2019, 232 fake Twitter accounts were found, among them 166 bots and 41 trolls. The bots, trolls, and fake accounts were operated from a variety of countries, only some of them identified, including France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Egypt and Indonesia. The potential reach of the bots and fake
accounts examined, which are part of the campaign to boycott the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest in Israel, is estimated at nearly 10 million Twitter users. In light of the fact that this report has thus far examined only some of the countries relevant to the campaign, and given our familiarity with the methods of operation of the boycott organizations, we strongly believe that the number of bots and fake accounts used in this deception scheme is much greater than the findings of this report.

5. The effectiveness of this deceptive campaign can be seen in the unusual and significant increase of the campaign's volume in specific, limited time periods which is evidence of intentional manipulation. For example, the various bots, trolls, and fake accounts were responsible for doubling the number of tweets in the campaign within two weeks. Thus, the Twitter campaign, which began in May 2018, garnered slightly less than 41,000 tweets as of February 23, 2019. Just 10 days later, on March 5th, the number of campaign tweets more than doubled to nearly 95,000. This is an unnatural leap, characteristic of campaigns that use technological means to flood the Internet.

6. The research found that Basem Naim, a senior Hamas figure who is also in charge of the "BDS portfolio" in the terrorist organization Hamas, participated in two "Twitter storms" carried out by a wide array of bots, used to promote the deception scheme. Thus, Naim tweeted calls to join the "Twitter storm" against the Eurovision Song Contest being held in Israel. These storms were instigated by the #GroupPalestine group. The examination of those behind #GroupPalestine continues, but it is already clear that content published is pro-Hamas.

7. The online deception campaign was manipulatively designed to create the appearance of an authentic popular protest against the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest taking place in Israel. This was intended to create an impression of significant public support aimed at pressuring European broadcasting corporations and artists participating in the competition to succumb to the boycott. Similarly, it aimed to increase the exposure of the campaign to boycott the Eurovision Song Contest in Israel. These actions are in line with
practices employed by the cultural boycott campaign against artists and cultural figures intending to perform in Israel - which range from behind-the-scenes physical threats to the artist and his/her family, exerting indirect pressure, intimidation, shaming etc.

8. In summary, a social media influence campaign to boycott the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest in Israel, was devised and spearheaded by the Ramallah-based Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) and other local boycott organizations around the world. This influence campaign spread in part by fraudulent means - using hundreds of bots, fake accounts and trolls. This was done to create a false impression of a large-scale popular campaign aimed at pressuring European public broadcasters and artists participating in the Eurovision to boycott the contest in Israel. The increasing intensity of the deception campaign in recent months indicates that in all likelihood that the scope of activity will increase as the Eurovision approaches. It is possible that this campaign will also attempt to influence the results of the song contest.

9. In light of the above, the State of Israel calls on:

   a. Social media companies - to conduct an in-depth examination of the manipulative use of their platforms by BDS-organizations and to stop any fraudulent activity supporting the campaign, especially as this deception campaign is likely to increase as the Eurovision approaches.

   b. European broadcasting corporations and the Eurovision artists - to be vigilant against deceptive campaigns aimed at them by the BDS-organizations and to give special attention to possible manipulative activity aimed at influencing the contest and its outcome.

   c. Countries, philanthropic foundations and financial institutions - to stop funding organizations which promote boycotts of the State of Israel, some of which, as documented in a report published in February, have connections with designated terrorist organizations.
The #BoycottEurovision2019 Campaign
The coordinated manipulation of the BDS campaign against Eurovision 2019

1. PACBI (Ramallah) initiates the #BoycottEurovision2019 campaign

2. BDS organizations join in

3. #GroupPalestine coordinates bot-induced twitter storms

- Twitter storm 23.3.2019
- Twitter storm 24.2.2019

- 9,754,451 Users' potential reach
- 232 fake accounts including 166 bots & 41 trolls
II. Methodology

10. The research on the campaign to boycott the Eurovision Song Contest in Israel focused on social networking activities bearing the hashtag #BoycottEurovision2019.

a. Definitions

11. Following are definitions of the types of fake accounts found in the study:

a. **Bot**: An account whose content is created by human operators and is proliferated automatically by software. An account that is used as a bot is usually a fake, but it can also be an authentic person who "volunteers" his or her profile for automated activity, perhaps to avoid Twitter’s defense mechanisms against deceptive activity on its platform. Its posts may repeat within minutes or even seconds, usually with no particular attention to the account’s authenticity, and with very few personal references to the content published. The bots were exposed on the basis of coordinated inauthentic behavior in the accounts examined.

b. **Troll**: An active fake account operated periodically by an authentic person, but without the details of the person operating it, but rather fictitious information. Most of its posts and reactions revolve around the same subject, and it creates and forces discussion on this issue in various forums.

c. **Avatar/ Fake Account**: An account with high reliability, with background and personal details appearing to be authentic, varied but non-random contacts, and with areas of interest not limited to a single issue or agenda. Such accounts are intended for long-term use and their use for a specific attack is less common.

12. **Twitter storm** – A sudden rise in activity around a particular subject, that is, a high concentration of tweets, within a limited time period, usually around a specific hashtag. The Twitter storms analyzed for this report were planned and organized in advance, and were not spontaneous.

13. **Reach/ Exposure** – The reach of a Twitter account is based on the sum of the number of followers of the account and the number of followers of each account
that has retweeted the tweets of that account. Therefore, the number reflects an estimate of maximum exposure.

**b. Research Methods**

The methodology is comprised of the following elements:

**Preliminary mapping of the arena**

14. In order to locate accounts that operate specifically in the Eurovision 2019 boycott campaign, in a manipulative and unethical manner (such as bots etc.), an initial mapping of the primary hashtag #BoycottEurovision2019 was carried out on leading social platforms.

15. The most influential posts containing the hashtag were then examined with the aim of identifying fake accounts that promote and/or interact with these posts, or with the accounts that posted them. At this preliminary stage, posts were examined in four different languages: English, French, Spanish and Italian.

16. In addition to identifying relevant fake accounts, local hashtags associated with the primary hashtag #BoycottEurovision2019 have also been identified in these posts.

17. In addition, tweets containing the primary hashtag were counted, and when abnormal increases or "jumps" were identified, the possible cause of such "jump" was examined.

**Identifying the accounts**

18. As part of the initial search, accounts containing a combination of several of the following indicators were identified as fake accounts, including bots and trolls:

- Number and type of members and followers
- Account details and information gaps
- Multiple monotonous and tendentious posts
- Suspicious images
- Suspicious patterns and posting times
- Additional data
19. It should be noted that an account with one or more of the above criteria does not necessarily indicate that it is a fake. Therefore, in the second stage of the study, each account was examined in depth.

Identifying a network of fake accounts

20. As the study proceeded it identified an organized network that includes many accounts, bots and trolls under the group #GroupPalestine, which has so far carried out two "Twitter storms". As will be detailed later in the report, the network was exposed by identifying the following components:

a. All the tweets associated with the storm included both the primary boycott hashtag as well as the group’s hashtag. Thus, it was possible to distinguish the accounts active within this network and the storms that it carried out, from other accounts that promote the boycott hashtag only.

b. The tweets were monitored and collected using readily available technological tools for analysis of account behavior and activity. These tools allow the identification of the top tweeters and the locating of posts with suspicious patterns, such as tweets whose content is repeated numerous times in one minute by the same account.

c. A number of admin accounts have been identified in several languages, sending guiding messages to other members of the network and recruiting new members.

d. 191 accounts of network members were gradually identified. Their details were carefully collected and classified as bots or trolls according to the characteristics identified in each account.

e. The study of #GroupPalestine continues.
III. The Findings

a. General

21. In recent months, a large-scale Twitter campaign has been waged against the Eurovision Song Contest in Israel under the #BoycottEurovision2019 hashtag. The campaign is active mainly in England, Spain, Italy and France. An examination of the data shows that the main organization behind the campaign is the Palestinian Academic of Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI), a Ramallah-based organization under whose guidance local boycott organizations operate throughout Europe.

22. An in-depth study, carried out by the Ministry of Strategic Affairs and Public Diplomacy from November 2018, aimed at examining the use and distribution of the hashtag, revealed that the "organic" influence-campaign against the Eurovision contest is promoted by a set of bots, trolls and fake accounts, designed for creating a distorted picture of an expansive authentic grass roots protest. So far, 232 fake accounts have been identified, of which 166 are bots and 41 trolls, according to the following breakdown:

a. The study estimates that the total potential reach for the 232 fake accounts is 9,754,451 Twitter accounts.

b. 113 fake accounts, of which 93 are bots and 12 trolls, were activated as part of two Twitter storms on February 24th 2019 and March 23rd 2019. These storms were managed by #GroupPalestine, for the purpose of doubling the reach of the campaign. The total potential reach of all the accounts identified thus far as participants in the two storms (107 identified in the first storm, 44 overlapping at the second storm, and 6 new ones in the second) is approximately 7,270,098.

c. 78 additional accounts were identified after the Twitter storms ended, which also belong to #GroupPalestine and they too tweeted against the Eurovision Song Contest. Of these, 64 are bots and 14 trolls. Their total reach is 1,756,106.
d. 41 fake accounts, 9 of which were bots, were activated during the general campaign that began in June 2018, immediately after Israel won the 2018 Eurovision contest, until the end of February 2019. Their total reach is 728,247.

b. The targeted arenas

23. To our understanding, the influence-campaign can be divided into three main parts, which also reflect the chronological development of the deception scheme, alongside the organic campaign. The following three sections of this report will describe each component of the campaign and those behind it:

a. PACBI – instigator of the campaign against the Eurovision Song Contest

As mentioned, PACBI launched the "organic" campaign under the primary hashtag #BoycottEurovision2019. This chapter will present the deception scheme that directly promoted PACBI’s own tweets against the Eurovision Song Contest.

b. The spread of the campaign to European countries and BDS organizations

Following its launch by PACBI in Ramallah, BDS organizations in various countries joined the campaign and also tweeted under the hashtag. This was done by using PACBI messages and creative products, and often by re-tweeting the content tweeted by PACBI. This chapter will detail the deception scheme that directly promoted the content of the local BDS organizations against the Eurovision Song Contest.

c. The #GroupPalestine Twitter storms

This chapter will describe the two Twitter storms in February and March of 2019 carried out by #GroupPalestine, a group of Twitter accounts, a significant portion of whose activity is coordinated from the Gaza Strip. The group "joined" the campaign to boycott the Eurovision Song Contest to strengthen it and increase its reach.
The Palestinian Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) – the instigator of the campaign against the Eurovision Song Contest

24. PACBI, a Palestinian organization based in Ramallah, is the cultural-academic boycott arm of the BDS National Committee (BNC), which heads the global boycott campaign against Israel. PACBI is recognized as the strategic and operational leader of local BDS organizations throughout Europe (and worldwide). Thus, organizations such as the PSC (Palestine Solidarity Campaign) in Britain, JVP (Jewish Voice for Peace) in the United States and others, promote the PACBI’s strategy in the countries where they are located. The cultural boycott campaign against Israel focused on preventing the arrival of artists and cultural figures to Israel. It was characterized by practices that include behind-the-scenes threats of physical harm against the artist and his/her family, exerting indirect pressure, intimidation, shaming etc.

25. PACBI directs the international campaign to boycott the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest in Israel and creates the content, messaging and creative materials for it. At the BNC conference (the organization to which PACBI is subordinate to), held in Ramallah in March 2019, Muhammad al-Aboushi, a member of the BNC Secretariat, claimed that "our campaign to boycott the Eurovision Song Contest in Tel Aviv is on the rise in Europe". One can see that the various local organizations (such as the BDS organizations in France, Spain, England etc.) constantly re-tweet PACBI’s tweets on a regular and consistent basis.

26. The deception scheme exposed to date, including bots, fake accounts and trolls, promotes both PACBI’s own tweets and the tweets of accounts of local organizations, which are strategically guided by PACBI and re-tweet much of PACBI’s own tweets. Following is a detailing of the bots and trolls that promoted PACBI tweets about the Eurovision Song Contest directly, which are not included in the above-mentioned Twitter storms or in promoting the tweets of local organizations (including those who re-tweeted PACBI):

a. 3 accounts – identified as trolls with a potential reach of 72,826 in total.

b. 3 accounts – identified as bots with a potential reach of 160,654 in total.

c. An account identified as authentic (an account of a music band) with a potential reach of 59,288 in total, where a single "boycott the Eurovision Song Contest" tweet was re-tweeted by a multitude of suspicious accounts (6,217 re-tweets and 27,582 likes of the tweet).

d. The potential reach for the 7 accounts mentioned above is 292,768.

27. Other fake accounts, trolls and bots which promoted the PACBI Eurovision campaign with other accounts – will be detailed later in the study.

ii. The spread of the campaign to European countries and BDS organizations

28. Spain

a. The Twitter campaign in Spain was launched by RESCOP\(^2\) and BDS-Spain, and was joined by other local BDS organizations, such as BDS-Catalunya\(^3\).

b. Whilst examining the fake accounts relating to activities in Spain to boycott the Eurovision Song Contest in 2019, a total of 7 accounts were identified, of which:

   (1) A fake account associated with a senior and key BNC activist in BDS Madrid, Ana Sanchez Mera, which does not disclose her personal details and operates under the name @anitajeru. The potential reach of this account is 42,427. As stated above, the BNC is the organizational framework within which PACBI operates, and is linked to terrorist organizations.

   (2) 3 accounts identified as fake with a potential reach of 89,775 in total.

   (3) 3 accounts identified as bots with a potential reach of 35 in total.

c. The total potential reach for the abovementioned accounts is 132,237.

\(^2\) RESCOP (Red Solidaria Contra La Ocupación de Palestina) is an umbrella organization of Spanish de-legitimization organizations and one of Spain’s leading BDS organizations.

29. **France**

   a. The Twitter campaign in France was launched by AFPS\(^4\) and BDS-France\(^5\).

   b. Whilst examining the fake accounts relating to the activities in France to boycott the Eurovision Song Contest in 2019, a total of 8 accounts were identified, of which:

   (1) 5 accounts identified as trolls with a potential reach of 18,939 in total.

   (2) 3 accounts identified as fake with a potential reach of 3 in total.

   c. **The total potential reach for the 8 abovementioned accounts is 18,942.**

30. **United Kingdom**

   a. The UK is one of the most active arenas in the Twitter campaign, involving several prominent organizations such as the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC), London Palestine Action (LPA) and Artists for Palestine UK.

   b. Whilst examining the fake accounts relating to activities in the UK to boycott the Eurovision Song Contest in 2019, a total of 7 accounts were identified, of which:

   (1) 3 accounts identified as trolls with a potential reach of 6,709 in total.

   (2) 3 accounts identified as bots with a potential reach of 179,499 in total.

   (3) An account identified as fake, with a potential reach of 70,587 in total.

   c. **The total potential reach for the 7 abovementioned accounts is 256,795.**

---

\(^4\) The AFPS Twitter page, embedded tweet, as of April 8, 2019, [https://twitter.com/AFPSOfficiel](https://twitter.com/AFPSOfficiel). The AFPS (Association France Palestine Solidarité) is one of the most prominent boycott organizations in France. AFPS cooperates with the BNC, the PACBI parent organization, and with Al-Haq, an organization headed by Shawan Jabarin, a former PFLP official who served a number of years in prison for terrorist activities. The organization is very active in the campaign against the Eurovision Song Contest in Israel, and has also participated in the campaign to cancel singer Lorde’s concert in Israel.

\(^5\) The BDS-France Twitter page, embedded tweet, as of April 8, 2019, [https://twitter.com/Campagnebds](https://twitter.com/Campagnebds). BDS-France is an umbrella framework for local boycott societies in France. Among other things, it is very active in the Eurovision campaign, and has in the past taken part in a campaign to cancel Lorde’s concert in Israel.
31. **Italy**

   a. Whilst examining the fake accounts relating to activities in Italy to boycott the Eurovision Song Contest in 2019, a total of 4 accounts identified, of which:

      (1) An account associated with a key activist in BDS-Sardegna, Ester Garau, under the handle @Est_erG. The potential reach of this account is 202 in total.

      (2) 3 accounts identified as fake with a potential reach of 452 in total.

   b. **The total potential reach for the abovementioned accounts is 654.**

32. **Other countries**

   a. **Australia** – Whilst examining the fake accounts relating to the activities in Australia to boycott the Eurovision Song Contest in 2019 found two accounts identified as fake with a potential reach of 26,747 in total.

   b. **Egypt and Indonesia** – For details of the fake accounts and bots from Egypt and Indonesia – see the appendices on the Twitter storms.

   c. Three accounts identified as trolls with a potential reach of 104 in total, were identified without geographical affiliation.

**iii. The Twitter Storms of #GroupPalestine**

33. The influence campaign against the Eurovision was significantly promoted by two Twitter storms, one on February 24th 2019 and the other on March 23rd 2019, carried out by #GroupPalestine – a group of accounts whose main base of activity is Twitter and most significant activity is Twitter storms.

34. **Characteristics of #GroupPalestine**

   a. According to the data arising from the research, a significant portion of the activity of the #GroupPalestine is in all probability coordinated from within the Gaza Strip. The Group is managed by multiple admin accounts⁶,

---

⁶ An admin account, as far as GroupPalestine and the Twitter storms it carried out are concerned, is used as a hub for trolls/bots in the same regional/language group, coordinates online the campaigns with other regions, initiates threads and Twitter campaigns, serves as an
and consists mainly of dedicated bots, managed by real people, who consistently tweet the content generated by #GroupPalestine as well as, from time to time, post original tweets. Furthermore, non-exclusive bots were also found in the group of accounts, which also tweet on political issues related to their countries of origin.

b. The group has a variety of accounts that have been active for several years, as well as new accounts that have recently joined it.

c. In light of the fact that many of the group’s accounts, which have existed for just a few months, have already amassed tens of thousands of tweets and "re-tweets", it is evident that the operators of this network of accounts use the re-tweeting tool automatically between the various accounts in the group.7

d. During the Twitter storms, #GroupPalestine made use of two foreign account groups, from Indonesia and Egypt, some of whom occasionally collaborate with the group in pro-Palestinian campaigns:

(1) The Egyptian group of accounts, which are bots for the #GroupPalestine network, evidently managed by the same person, tweeted over the first day of the Twitter storm 1,696 tweets against the Eurovision Song Contest, with an estimated reach of 57,310 accounts.

---

7 There are currently a variety of tools on the market, some free, which allow human operators to feed content into these tools so as to automatically post tweets or to perform more complex tasks, such as running a bot network. Some of these tools allow automatic re-tweeting of content from within a particular account, while others allow the human operator to schedule tweets at specific times during the day, as per their choice, and sometimes these capabilities are combined into one tool. In the case of the Twitter storm, it is clear that the tool used is a tool that enables not only the input of content at specific times, but also automatic re-tweeting between the accounts that make up the network.
(2) Seven Indonesian accounts, apparently linked to a group of hackers, also tweeted against the Eurovision Song Contest, with an estimated reach of 166,573 accounts. These accounts served as bots for the #GroupPalestine network as well as trolls for the Indonesian presidential campaign.

e. The research shows that this group is organized internally, and includes networks, regulated communication and the characteristics of an organized operation.

35. #GroupPalestine's contributed to the influence campaign against the Eurovision in the following manner:

a. **A total of 113 fake accounts that participated in the two twitter storms have been identified** – of them 107 participated in the first Twitter storm (of which 44 also participated in the second storm), and another 6 new accounts that participated only in the second storm. **These 113 accounts have a total potential reach of 7,270,098 accounts**, with a potential reach of 6,963,316 for the first Twitter storm and 306,782 for the second Twitter storm.

b. Among the 113 fake accounts that were identified, the distribution is as follows:

   (1) 93 bots with a potential reach of 6,318,209 in total.
   (2) 12 trolls with a potential reach of 732,684 in total.
   (3) 6 admin accounts of #GroupPalestine with a potential reach of 219,205 in total.
   (4) 2 accounts that no longer exist.

c. 78 additional accounts were identified after the end of the Twitter storms. These accounts also belong to #GroupPalestine and participated in promoting the storms by posting and re-tweeting posts containing the two hashtags (#BoycottEurovision2019, #GroupPalestine). Out of the 78

---

8 As at the publication date of the study, 2 of the accounts identified at the end of the first storm no longer exist, and therefore their reach cannot be examined.
accounts, 64 are bots, and 14 trolls, with a total reach of 1,756,106. The research will not present the distribution of these accounts between the two storms.

d. A total of 191 fake accounts, including 157 bots, 26 trolls, 6 admin accounts, and 2 accounts that no longer exist, participated in the #GroupPalestine Twitter storms. The total potential reach of these accounts is 9,026,204.

36. Ties to Hamas

a. The study found that Basem Naim, a senior Hamas figure and holder of the BDS portfolio in the terrorist organization, participated in the #GroupPalestine Twitter storms in a way that significantly increased their exposure. Naim’s account took part in promoting the two storms. Naim is a member of the Hamas political bureau, heads the Foreign Relations Council and serves as the "Head of the Boycott Campaign in Palestine". 

b. Bassem Naim tweeted in his Twitter account on February 2211 the content of the main tweet of the February 24 storm that called for participation in the Twitter storm.12

Basem Naim, a senior Hamas figure, calling to join the Twitter storm

---

During the second #GroupPalestine Twitter storm against Eurovision 2019, which took place on March 23, 2019, Basem Naim re-tweeted a post of one of the bots calling to join the new storm.

As can be seen below, at the bottom of the tweet surrounded by red in Naim's re-tweet:

![Image](https://example.com/image.png)

a. Naim's account contains 37 original tweets consisting with the hashtag #BoycottEurovision2019, even when the content of the tweets does not deal with the Eurovision Song Contest. His tweets to promote the Eurovision campaign are some of the most popular tweets (according to the number of re-tweets) in the central hashtag.

b. In addition, an examination of the tweets of #GroupPalestine accounts indicates support of the Hamas terrorist organization and the contents posted by the organization online, including glorifying terrorists from the military branch, Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

---

37. **The first Twitter storm against the Eurovision Song Contest (February 24th, 2019)**

   a. **The scope of activity**

      The storm included 4,308 tweets, in which 107 fake accounts were identified so far, and the potential reach for this activity is **6,963,316 accounts** (it should be noted that the authentic account of Basem Naim, a senior Hamas figure who took part in the campaign, raised the potential reach to **7,108,123**). Below is a detailing of the 108 accounts found so far:

      - **87 accounts were identified as bots** with a potential reach of 6,011,427 in total, of these 87, 5 accounts were suspended and 16 are not available.

      - **12 accounts identified as trolls** with a potential reach of 732,684 in total.

      - **6 accounts identified as admins** of #GroupPalestine with a potential reach of 219,205 in total.

      - 2 of the accounts identified no longer exist.\(^{16}\)

      - In addition to the 107 fake accounts listed above, **the account of Basem Naim, a senior Hamas figure** with a potential reach of 144,807, also took part in the storm.

   b. **The components of the activity**\(^{17}\)

      - The storm was initiated at first by the Group’s various admin accounts, including the #GroupPalestine admin account\(^{18}\). The first tweet was posted on February 21\(^{st}\), with an invitation to join the storm on February 24\(^{th}\).\(^{19}\)

---

\(^{16}\) As a result, the reach for these accounts could not be examined.

\(^{17}\) See detailing in Appendix C.

\(^{18}\) See the Group Palestine admin's Twitter page, [https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English](https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English).

\(^{19}\) The GroupPalestine Twitter Page, February 2019, [https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English/status/1098590774822879237](https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English/status/1098590774822879237).
- The bot accounts that have been found, such as in the example below\textsuperscript{20}, include a combination of some of the following characteristics: a relatively new creation date; the absence of a personal image and use of a generic image and/or one that expresses the agenda being disseminated; a misleading or completely fake name; and generally content related to #GroupPalestine in the biographical section of the account.

![Bot example image]

\textbf{c.} Following is a visual illustration of the significant increase in the volume of the #BoycottEurovision2019 hashtag tweets after the first Twitter storm of #GroupPalestine, due to bots activity:

![Graph showing increase in tweets]

\textbf{38. The second Twitter storm against the Eurovision Song Contest (March 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2019)}

\textbf{a. The scope of activity}

The storm included 2,790 tweets, which included \textbf{50 fake accounts identified by the end of the storm} (as well as additional accounts \url{https://Twitter.com/dislike66} (the account no longer exists, as of early April).
identified later in the research phase and detailed separately), and the potential reach in respect of this activity is 3,803,360. Of these accounts, 44 accounts participated in the first Twitter storm, and 6 are new accounts, all of them bots. Of the 50 accounts:

- **41 bots** (from both the first and the second storm) with a total potential reach of 3,409,788 accounts. Of these 41 bots, 6 new bot accounts with a potential reach of 306,782 accounts in total.

- **9 trolls** (already identified at the first storm) with a total potential reach of 393,572 accounts.

- The mapping and identification of the fake accounts that participated in the second Twitter storm continue, and there is a high probability that dozens of new accounts will be identified as having participated in this storm.

b. **The components of the activity**

The second Twitter storm was launched by the @GroupPs_Eng admin account on March 16, 2019. Two more tweets, almost identical to this tweet, were posted within minutes by this account. The tweet calls for participation in the Twitter storm and includes the hashtags #BoycottEurovision2019 and #GroupPalestine.

- Since March 16 this tweet was tweeted 752 times.

**c. Examples of the deception campaign to pressure public broadcasters and artists participating in the Eurovision Song Contest**

Below are some examples of the bots' contribution to creating the appearance of authentic public pressure on the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and the artists chosen to participate in the Eurovision Song Contest in Israel:

a. **Pressure on the EBU**

21 The GroupPalestine Twitter Page, March 2019, [https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English/status/1106822040323944453](https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English/status/1106822040323944453).
22 The GroupPalestine Twitter Page, March 2019, [https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English/status/110682268741541888](https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English/status/110682268741541888).
(1) The bot Maureen re-tweeting a tweet posted by PACBI’s account:23

(2) The bot Khaled Sabih re-tweeting a tweet originally posted by London – Palestine Action.24

b. Pressure on artists chosen to participate in the Eurovision Song Contest

(1) The bot Khaled Sabih re-tweeting a tweet originally posted by SelmaJaffa48.25 (It will be noted that Sabih deleted the tweet and the referral to Selma’s Twitter account), with the aim of influencing the Italian contender, Alessandro Mahmoud.

---

(2) The bot "Resistance=Freedom" re-tweets Artists for Palestine UK\(^26\) (the reference is to the Twitter account of Artists for Palestine UK as the tweet is no longer available on the "Resistance=Freedom" Twitter account), with the aim of influencing the British contender, Michael Rice.

(3) The troll Mabrouk L’indigné re-tweets BDS France\(^27\) with the aim of influencing the French contender, Bilal Hissani.


c. **Pressure on broadcast corporations**

(1) The bot AhlamFares re-tweets a tweet posted by BDS-Madrid, with the aim of influencing the Spanish Broadcasting Association.

(2) The bot arequian re-tweets RESCOP, with the aim of influencing the Spanish Broadcasting Association.

---


29 The arequian Twitter page, December 2018, [https://Twitter.com/RESCOP1/status/1070431843168718849](https://Twitter.com/RESCOP1/status/1070431843168718849)
d. **Pressure on Madonna**

Following the announcement of Madonna's scheduled performance at the Eurovision Song Contest, the #GroupPalestine accounts, which also function as bots, started twitting against her:

https://twitter.com/khanfar60/status/1117252568915369985
https://twitter.com/rifqi32bgr/status/1117213057422245888
https://twitter.com/mmmoongoddess/status/1116504082536177664
IV. Appendix A - #GroupPalestine – additional information

1. As of today, it is not clear when this Twitter group was established and who were its founders. However, the first tweet detected using the hashtag #GroupPalestine was published on April 1, 2017, and in the months that followed, the organized operation has developed.

2. The network is composed, as noted, of admin accounts and various bot groups. Admin accounts do not necessarily represent the starting point for tweets. However, the admins do post messages directed to the members of the #GroupPalestine network, referring to these accounts as "members" and it is highly likely they constitute an interface point between all accounts.

3. In the course of the research on the group #GroupPalestine, additional tweets were found that attest to the organized nature of this group and to internal communication among the group's administrators and members. For example, on March 7, 2019, the @cyanbullerfly Twitter account, one of the major accounts in #GroupPalestine, published the following post in which it thanked all members of the group for re-tweeting the posts published by the admin account @GroupPs_English:

4. The existence of an organized group is also evident in the publications of the group's administrators. For example, the following tweets published by the admin account and the account of a graphic designer who is partner in the group, respectively, calling for new members to join the group:  

5. Finally, the study revealed that when a non-member account shares content containing the hashtag #GroupPalestine, it immediately receives a response from the group members inviting it to join the group, as shown in the example

below. This is done both for fake accounts external to the network,\textsuperscript{37} and for real people and BDS organizations:\textsuperscript{38}

6. **Ties between #GroupPalestine and media entities**

   a. The study shows that there is a connection between #GroupPalestine and the Palestine News Today news portal.\textsuperscript{39} In this portal, publications were identified on the main page, in which the hashtag #GroupPalestine is tagged

---

\textsuperscript{37} The Palestine 1948 Twitter page, January 2019, 
[https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English/status/1086695078494695424](https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English/status/1086695078494695424); The Angel de DestrucTector Twitter page, January 2019, 
[https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English/status/108114988331328307](https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English/status/108114988331328307). 

\textsuperscript{38} The BCP Twitter page, January 2019, 
[https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English/status/1088874674296111104](https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English/status/1088874674296111104). 

\textsuperscript{39} The Palestine News Today portal, [https://www.palestinенews.today](https://www.palestinенews.today).
along with other hashtags calling for the boycott and denunciation of Israel.\textsuperscript{40}

b. **The Shehab news agency**

There are a number of indications of a connection between \#GroupPalestine and the Shehab news agency, which supports the terrorist organization Hamas:

1) Thus, for example, on March 20, 2019, an account in the \#GroupPalestine network shared an image\textsuperscript{41} generated by Shehab regarding the deaths of three Palestinians as a result of a drone attack. **This publication also contains the hashtag** \#BoycottEurovision2019:


\textsuperscript{41} The Palestinia Via Niali Twitter page, March 2019, [https://Twitter.com/PSRiver2TheSea/status/1108343202124304384](https://Twitter.com/PSRiver2TheSea/status/1108343202124304384).
2) Furthermore, the @cyanbutterfly account, previously mentioned in the context of the Twitter storm and a member of the #GroupPalestine network, tagged the #GroupPalestine admin account when responding to the Shehab news agency’s tweet, and in this response also included the hashtags #GroupPalestine and #BoycottEurovision2019:

![Tweet from cyanbutterfly](https://Twitter.com/cyanbutterfly/status/1103020263770411009)

---

42 [https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English](https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English).

V. Appendix B - Twitter Storms

As detailed, over the course of February the #GroupPalestine group harnessed its network of fake accounts to carry out the first Twitter storm in support of a boycott of the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest, with tweets of call-to-action containing a combination of the leading hashtag in the boycott of the Eurovision, #BoycottEurovision2019, and the group #GroupPalestine hashtag.

The call was launched on February 21st and the first storm took place on February 24th. On March 16th, the group announced another Twitter storm as part of promoting the boycott on the Eurovision Song Contest, of a similar nature, which took place on March 23rd, a month after the first storm.

The First Twitter Storm

a. The confirmation that the #GroupPalestine group initiated the storm (and not only promoted it) came after it was revealed that a dedicated Google site was created to promote the campaign, and that it included a variety of tweets in several languages for use during the Twitter storm.44

b. These Tweets were uploaded to the Pastebin site by a user named JAFFASELMA.

c. Attached is the publication of the person behind the fake Twitter account @SelmaJaffa48, whose operator admits in a different tweet that he is part of the #GroupPalestine team after being tagged and receiving thanks from the admin accounts for his work.

![Image](image1.png)

d. Following is an example of one of the bots that were retrieved, belonging to #GroupPalestine, which allows the examination of successive posting times for the same post – which is the leading tweet of the Twitter storm.

![Image](image2.png)


e. On February 24, 2019, the same admin account mentioned above thanked all the members of the group for their participation in the Twitter storm that took place on the same day, and at the same time tagged many of the main members exposed in this study:

![Image](https://example.com/image.png)

The Second Twitter Storm

Following are some examples of accounts that stood out in their activity:

1) The most prominent account is the MUSLIM LIVES MATTER account, which belongs to a user from India. Although this account was created in 2015, it did not share content related to Palestinian affairs until November 12, 2018. On that date, it shared a tweet originally posted on October 29, 2018. An hour later, this account posted exactly the same tweet, but this time it added, among other things, the hashtag #GroupPalestine.

---

48 The GroupPalestine Twitter Page, February 2019, [https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English/status/1100429368755535873](https://Twitter.com/GroupPs_English/status/1100429368755535873).

49 [https://Twitter.com/UmmatEMuslimin](https://Twitter.com/UmmatEMuslimin) - The page does not exist, as of April 8, 2019.

50 [https://Twitter.com/hamada_najar/status/1057027977165312000](https://Twitter.com/hamada_najar/status/1057027977165312000).

51 Since the account [https://Twitter.com/UmmatEMuslimin](https://Twitter.com/UmmatEMuslimin) no longer exists, it appears there is an identical account that goes by the username @imran_botad, which is attached to the Muslim Lives Matter account. The original link for this post.
Furthermore, while in the beginning the account mainly followed news pages and pages dealing with political affairs of India, and occasionally accounts related to Palestinian affairs, at some point the account began to massively follow members of the group #GroupPalestine.

2) Another account identified among the participants of the second Twitter storm is an Indonesian account called Indonesia Menang (@Angelyca_Nayoan2).\(^2\) This account was created recently, on March 2, 2019, after a previous account with an almost identical username, @Angelyca_Nayoan, was suspended, as the account specifies in its bio section. The bio section also includes the hashtag #GroupPalestine:

[Image: Twitter page of Indonesia Menang]

(https://Twitter.com/UmmatEMuslimin/status/1061954280184152064) is directed to a new link for the post: https://twitter.com/imran_botad/status/1061954280184152064.

3) A third account, also Indonesian, named @AnonymousID__ was created in 2012, and currently includes the hashtag #GroupPalestine in its bio section.

A tweet it posted on March 20, 2019 to promote the second Twitter storm has received 116 re-tweets and 151 likes, so this account comes up as one of the most influential accounts of the second Twitter storm:

4) Finally, this account and another account named @gsh______, also belonging to #GroupPalestine, both include in their bio section a link to the Anonymous Indonesian hacker site. This reinforces the conclusion that there is a network of

55 April 2019, https://Twitter.com/gsh______.
Indonesian accounts dedicated to disseminating content in support of the #GroupPalestine Twitter storms:

As will be detailed below, other Indonesian accounts were identified in connection with the first Twitter storm.

In addition, during the second Twitter storm, it was revealed that #GroupPalestine is following the results of the #BoycottEurovision2019 campaign. Evidence of the fact was found in the following tweet posted on March 20, 2019, and then re-tweeted by several members of the group.

The involvement of Indonesian and Egyptian activists in the Twitter storms

Data collected from the monitoring of the official #BoycottEurovison2019 hashtag, revealed unusual activity on the part of Indonesian and Egyptian accounts. In our examination, the following accounts came up as belonging to these countries,
contributing to the strengthening of the first and second Twitter storm and the boycott of the Eurovision Song Contest:

**Involvement of Indonesian activists**

Below are some of the other accounts we have uncovered that promote #GroupPalestine on Twitter and are located in Indonesia and/or post in Indonesian (“Bahasa Indonesia”) often using Latin script (the @Jr_Vint account tweets in English). These accounts use the #GroupPalestine hashtag and also tweet on the #GroupPalestine admin accounts on anti-Israeli/ pro-Palestinian issues.

- The account [https://Twitter.com/raya_mammina](https://Twitter.com/raya_mammina)
  - 4563 followers, **opened in November 2018**. Potential reach: **28,436**
- The account [https://Twitter.com/Anka_Ra3434](https://Twitter.com/Anka_Ra3434)
  - 1693 followers, opened in May 2017. Potential reach: 3,868
  - The account has previously tweeted on other Twitter storms of #GroupPalestine, such as this tweet:
    - [https://Twitter.com/Anka_Ra3434/status/106667418452258816](https://Twitter.com/Anka_Ra3434/status/106667418452258816)
- The account [https://Twitter.com/reftyWF](https://Twitter.com/reftyWF)
  - The account tweeted once about the Twitter storm:
    - [https://Twitter.com/reftyWF/status/1098614738735443968](https://Twitter.com/reftyWF/status/1098614738735443968)
- The account [https://Twitter.com/Jr_Vint](https://Twitter.com/Jr_Vint)
  - The account has tweeted in the past on other Twitter storms of #GroupPalestine:
    - [https://Twitter.com/Jr_Vint/status/1064909832493260800](https://Twitter.com/Jr_Vint/status/1064909832493260800)
    - [https://Twitter.com/Jr_Vint/status/1078702651120922624](https://Twitter.com/Jr_Vint/status/1078702651120922624)
    - [https://Twitter.com/Jr_Vint/status/1063834903626665984](https://Twitter.com/Jr_Vint/status/1063834903626665984)
  - In addition, below are three tweets in Bahasa about the Twitter storm but none of the accounts appear to be linked to #GroupPalestine.
  - The tweet of @arum7news:
    - [https://Twitter.com/arum7news/status/1098704458412748801](https://Twitter.com/arum7news/status/1098704458412748801)
    - 245 followers in the account, opened in March 2017. Potential reach: **45,016**
  - The tweet of @hanifah932:
    - [https://Twitter.com/hanifah932/status/1098608235517566976](https://Twitter.com/hanifah932/status/1098608235517566976)
    - 854 followers in the account, opened in December 2016. Potential reach: 44,444
  - The tweet of @nokishitaichiza (writes both in Indonesian and in Japanese):
    - [https://Twitter.com/nokishitaichiza/status/1098704912240631808](https://Twitter.com/nokishitaichiza/status/1098704912240631808)
- 142 followers in the account, opened in September 2017. Potential reach: 14,668

**Total potential reach of the Indonesian accounts identified above: 166,573 accounts.**

**Involvement of Egyptian Fake Accounts**

An examination of the accounts involved in the first Twitter storm of #GroupPalestine on February 24th, identified 10 accounts originating in Alexandria, Egypt. It appears that they are managed by the same person as the user names are variations of the same nickname. Below are the ten accounts identified, along with the potential reach of each account, and the number of tweets that include the hashtag #BoycottEurovision2019 found in each account:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account</th>
<th>Approximate tweets on the topic of the Eurovision Song Contest</th>
<th>Potential reach of the account</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://Twitter.com/dodododonani15">https://Twitter.com/dodododonani15</a></td>
<td>157</td>
<td>10,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://Twitter.com/dodonani15">https://Twitter.com/dodonani15</a></td>
<td>233</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://Twitter.com/dodo15dodonani">https://Twitter.com/dodo15dodonani</a></td>
<td>156</td>
<td>7,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://Twitter.com/nanidodonani">https://Twitter.com/nanidodonani</a></td>
<td>158</td>
<td>9,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://Twitter.com/dodododo15nani">https://Twitter.com/dodododo15nani</a></td>
<td>162</td>
<td>8,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://Twitter.com/dodonanidido">https://Twitter.com/dodonanidido</a></td>
<td>161</td>
<td>6,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://Twitter.com/dodo15naninani">https://Twitter.com/dodo15naninani</a></td>
<td>161</td>
<td>6,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://Twitter.com/15dodonani">https://Twitter.com/15dodonani</a></td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://Twitter.com/dodo15nani">https://Twitter.com/dodo15nani</a></td>
<td>191</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://Twitter.com/dodonaninani">https://Twitter.com/dodonaninani</a></td>
<td>161</td>
<td>6,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,696</strong></td>
<td><strong>57,310</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to statistics from March 18, 2019, about **2,400 references** of the #BoycottEurovision2019 hashtag came from Egypt. The total number of references represented by the above accounts is 1,696, which constitutes 70% of the total amount identified as originating in Egypt. Therefore, there is a high probability that this group of accounts is primarily responsible for this cluster of references from Egypt.
VI. Appendix C – Bots - An in-depth look

Below are examples of fake Twitter accounts used as bots.

A central parameter common to these bots is a few tweets tweeted at uncharacteristically short or unreasonable intervals, which indicate that they were automatically generated. Some accounts exhibit an abnormal average daily tweet rate, further corroborating that these accounts are indeed bots.

1. **Account #1: Phoenix from the Ashes**
   a. **Facts and Figures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>URL</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/Filistin_Roots">https://twitter.com/Filistin_Roots</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date created</td>
<td>March 2, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Followers</td>
<td>4,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following</td>
<td>4,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total tweets (incl. re-tweets)</td>
<td>71,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. tweets daily</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of tweets during first Twitter storm 24.2</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total amount of tweets promoting boycott of Eurovision 2019 as part of #GroupPalestine</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential reach</td>
<td>49,451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Below are five tweets released by the bot in a 60-second period.
c. On February 24, 2019 the bot account re-tweeted Khaled Sbeh (itslef a bot account) seven times in one 60-second period:

2. Account #2: Khaled Alzbiech (خالد الصبيح)

a. Facts and Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>URL</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/ty4_e">https://twitter.com/ty4_e</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date created</td>
<td>August 19, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Followers</td>
<td>912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total tweets (incl. re-tweets)</td>
<td>13,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. tweets daily</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of tweets during first Twitter storm 24.2</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total amount of tweets promoting boycott of Eurovision 2019 as part of #GroupPalestine</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential reach</td>
<td>49,451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. This bot tweeted 8 times a minute at 16:54 on January 24, 2019 (during the first Twitter storm), all of which were re-tweets of other bots in #GroupPalestine’s network (@khaled_sbeh2, @6echelon).
3. **Account #3: Khaled Alzbiech (خالد الصبيح)- Twin account of #2**

a. **Facts and Figures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>URL</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/khaled_sbeh2">https://twitter.com/khaled_sbeh2</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date created</td>
<td>March 2, 2107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Followers</td>
<td>1,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total tweets (incl. re-tweets)</td>
<td>16,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. tweets daily</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of tweets during first Twitter storm 24.2</td>
<td>99(^{57})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total amount of tweets promoting boycott of Eurovision 2019 as part of #GroupPalestine</td>
<td>99(^{57})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. This account generated tweets that were then re-tweeted by other bots in the #GroupPalestine network.

c. For example, during the first Twitter storm, this bot tweeted eight original tweets at 10:58 and another seven original tweets at 10:59, a minute later:

   ![Example tweet](image)

   ![Example tweet](image)

d. Another example of the automated systematic pattern employed by the account is the numbering of its tweets, as seen above, as well as below:

   ![Example tweet](image)

---

\(^{57}\) Released during February 24, 2019.
4. Account #4: Resistance=Freedom

a. Facts and Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>URL</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/khanfar60">https://twitter.com/khanfar60</a> (Account was suspended in April 2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date created</td>
<td>November 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Followers</td>
<td>2,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following</td>
<td>5,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total tweets (incl. re-tweets)</td>
<td>116,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. tweets daily</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total amount of tweets against Eurovision 2019 in one 24 hour period.</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total amount of tweets connected to Twitter storms against Eurovision 2019</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. This account was active until April 21, 2019.

c. The account was most active on April 14th, 2019, when it released 117 original tweets, including the hashtag #GroupPalestine and #BoycottEurovision2019. The tweets also included additional related hashtags such as #apartheidIsrael, #GreatMarchReturn and #ICC4Israel.

d. It appears this account was created solely to expand and propagate the reach of certain hashtags on Twitter’s platform against Israel’s hosting of the Eurovision. Examples include:

- #BoycottNYPost
- #MAGA
- #jesus
- #BDS
- #ICC4Israel
- #BoycottEurovision2019
- #AfricanAmerican
- #Catholic
#wakeupAmerica #church #GroupPalestine #congress #Jerusalem #Islamophobia #Trump2020 #AntiSemitism #GreatReturnMarch #HumanRights #SouthAfrica #ApartheidIsrael #NYC #IstandWithIlhan https://t.co/XWt8OmKRSw

- #MIvCSK #BDS #GroupPalestine #Palestine #Trump2020 #BoycottEurovision2019 #church #Catholic #morons #Congress #UK #Islamophobia #Orthodox #baptiste #WakeupAmerica #Republicans #NY #MAGA #faith #Jerusalem #school #GreatReturnMarch #leadership #universities #BlackLivesMatter https://t.co/FiMIJoWrBI

5. Account #5: Dessy Jamilee Gesit Atmojo

a. Facts and Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>URL</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/@AndrianHana">https://twitter.com/@AndrianHana</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date created</td>
<td>August 12, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Followers</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following</td>
<td>1,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total tweets (incl. re-tweets)</td>
<td>14,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total amount of tweets during Twitter storm against Eurovision 2019.</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total amount of tweets connected to Twitter storms against Eurovision 2019</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. An account of an Indonesian woman, named Dessy Jamilee Gesit Atmojo, which sometimes functions as a bot, such as during the first Twitter storm (and is therefore classified as a bot in this report).

c. Over the last few months the account has been re-tweeting tweets, mainly with the #GroupPalestine hashtag, in unusually high frequency per day. The original tweets are re-tweeted in a variety of languages, including Italian, French and Arabic.

d. During the day of the first Twitter storm, February 24, 2019, the account tweeted 43 times. Of these, a significant automatic activity was detected with 15 tweets released in the same minute, at 4:48 am. The fact that the re-tweets contained 15 separate tweets, reinforces the conclusion that the account was being run automatically by a bot:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>CONTENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @GroupPs_Arabic: #Eurovision #GroupPalestine #BoycottEurovision2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @Ghalianno: @Iailelkha 👇 #GroupPalestine 👇 #BoycottEurovision2019 <a href="https://t.co/W1xsXS0vV58">https://t.co/W1xsXS0vV58</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @Mindmenow: @Eurovision #DareToDream of a #FreePalestine #BoycottEurovision2019 #GroupPalestine <a href="https://t.co/0dARrR5740">https://t.co/0dARrR5740</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @amon7ps: @Eurovision #GroupPalestine #BoycottEurovision2019 02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @amon7ps: @AnahitaAredvi Thank you for your support 🌻 #GroupPalestine #BoycottEurovision2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @amon7ps: @Mindmenow @Eurovision Thank you so much dear to our support 🌻❤️ #GroupPalestine #BoycottEurovision2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @Ghalianno: @Iailelkha 👇 #GroupPalestine 👇 #BoycottEurovision2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @ENabhsn: 👇 #GroupPalestine 👇 #BoycottEurovision2019 <a href="https://t.co/V8LU9dGFrK">https://t.co/V8LU9dGFrK</a> <a href="https://t.co/9XN0Kry9XN">https://t.co/9XN0Kry9XN</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @Ghalianno: @amon7ps 👇 #GroupPalestine 👇 #BoycottEurovision2019 <a href="https://t.co/x22DoFECSI">https://t.co/x22DoFECSI</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @Ghalianno: @Eurovision 👇 #GroupPalestine 👇 #BoycottEurovision2019 <a href="https://t.co/QeUtTOCSDS">https://t.co/QeUtTOCSDS</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @amon7ps: @Ghalianno @Eurovision #GroupPalestine #BoycottEurovision2019 <a href="https://t.co/hSc9Y5m25d">https://t.co/hSc9Y5m25d</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @Ghalianno: @amon7ps @Eurovision 👇 #GroupPalestine 👇 #BoycottEurovision2019 👇 BDS 👇 #ApartheidIsrael</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @Ghalianno: Join us tomorrow 24th February 07:00 PM Palestine time 👇 #GroupPalestine 👇 #BoycottEurovision2019 👇 <a href="https://t.co/RdHO7bZnKT">https://t.co/RdHO7bZnKT</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @Ghalianno: @amon7ps @Eurovision 👇 #GroupPalestine 👇 #BoycottEurovision2019 <a href="https://t.co/cfEzXkiWXP">https://t.co/cfEzXkiWXP</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/24/19 4:48 am</td>
<td>RT @amon7ps: @Eurovision ❤️ 🌻 👇 #GroupPalestine #BoycottEurovision2019 <a href="https://t.co/N8Mq5CQXTa">https://t.co/N8Mq5CQXTa</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
e. As of the writing of the report, the account is still active in #GroupPalestine, and is now promoting other campaigns such as #SavePalestine. There is a possibility that in the days leading up to the Eurovision Song Contest, it will again begin promoting the boycott of this year’s event:
VII. Appendix D - The Palestinian Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) – Originator of the Boycott against the Eurovision

Organizational Structure

1. PACBI is the cultural-academic boycott arm of the leading boycott organization, the BDS National Committee (BNC). PACBI consists of three committees: A Steering Committee; an Advisory Committee; a Founding Committee. The first two committees are responsible for the organization’s ongoing activities, and serve as its operational engine. Alongside the committees, the organization also has a number of coordinators. The role of the coordinator is of great importance in the ties and connections between the Steering Committee and the Advisory Committee, between PACBI and BNC, and between PACBI and its partners worldwide.

2. Under PACBI’s influence, affiliates have been established over the years to exert pressure in the fields of culture and academia around the world. Thus, in the United States, Belgium, North Africa, and the Far East, these organizations endorsed BDS and the PACBI guidelines for cultural and academic boycotts (as discussed above).

PACBI links to designated terrorist organizations

3. PACBI is part of the BNC coalition and, as stated, serves as its academic and cultural arm. In practice, the two are working in full cooperation and coordination. Omar Barghouti, a member of the BNC secretariat and known as the co-founder of the BDS movement, is a member of PACBI’s Founding Committee.

4. The ranking member of the BNC is the "Council of Palestinian National and Islamic Forces" (PNIF), itself an umbrella framework of 12 organizations,

---

58 From the PACBI website, January 2012. https://bit.ly/2tBtRnE.
61 The BDS website, the annual conference, https://bdsmovement.net/bnc.
including five designated terrorist organizations, among them: Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Palestine Liberation Front.62

5. PACBI and the National Islamic Forces have signed the BDS call since 2005.63 Furthermore, representatives of the National Islamic Forces also take an active part in the BNC conferences.64

6. Haidar Eid, one of the founders of PACBI, noted that the National Islamic Forces are part of the BNC organization and its campaigns. At the same time, Eid even claimed that the terrorist organization Hamas was represented within the BNC Secretariat within the framework of the National Islamic Forces.65

7. It should be noted that Salah Khawaja, a member of the BNC Secretariat,66 is also a former operative of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and a member of the leadership of the National Islamic Forces.67 Khawaja has been arrested several times since the 1980s for his involvement in terrorist activities. His arrest in 2016 led to a trial and conviction of training and of contact with a "hostile element". Khawaja was sentenced to 12 months in prison and a fine.

Financial ties between PACBI and BNC

8. In December 2018, the DonorBox crowdfunding platform no longer allowed the BNC to fundraise through its platform. DonorBox also issued a statement clarifying that the cancellation was made because of the ties between the BNC and the coalition of the Islamic National Forces, which incorporates a number of

---

64 For example, the words of Wasel Abu Yousef, a member of the Palestine Liberation Front and the National Islamic Forces Coordinator. The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, April 2019, p. 3, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2019/04/H_075_19.pdf.
designated terrorist organizations. As a result of the cancellation, the BNC posted on its website, a few days later, that it is possible to continue donating to it.

68 See footnote 9.
through a donation to PACBI. Thus, beyond organizational ties, one can learn about the nature of the financial ties between the two organizations.
The Big Scam:
How BDS is Manipulating Social Media Against Eurovision 2019

APRIL 2019
The BNC appeals for donations through PACBI (screenshot from the BNC site)

The use of cultural terror against artists and athletes

9. Over the past two years, we have witnessed a significant increase in the volume of activity of PACBI and its affiliates around the world. They began to use methods of intimidation, pressure and threats against artists and cultural figures so that they refrain from appearing in Israel. Following are some prominent cases in which BDS organizations and activists have resorted to tactics of "cultural terrorism":

a. **Argentina** – In anticipation of the friendly match that was to be held in Israel in June 2018, the BDS organizations in Argentina and worldwide launched a wide-ranging online campaign against the holding of the friendly match between the teams under the hashtag #Argentinanovayas (Argentina don’t go).

   Alys Samson Estapé, the BNC campaign coordinator in Europe, was one of the organizers of the cultural terror campaign against the Argentinian team. In this framework, explicit threats were sent to the stars of the Argentinian team and their families to refrain from appearing in Israel. The highlight was the splattering of Lionel Messi’s jersey with blood.

   Web fundraising platform has removed the possibility of donating to PACBI a few days later. Indeed, the link on the BNC site to donate to it through this platform has been removed. To our understanding, the donation was apparently removed because of the suspicion that there are ties between the organization and designated terrorist organizations, in a manner constituting a violation of American law.

---

71 Interview with Al Jazeera, YouTube, June 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U-a3Yz5cXto.
stains. Following the intimidation campaign, the Argentina team was forced to announce the cancellation of the friendly in Israel.\(^72\)

b. **Msallam Hdaib** – The Jordanian artist and rapper of the Palestinian origin, Msallam Hdaib, published his intention to perform in Haifa in August-September 2018. PACBI and the BNC exerted public pressure on Msallam, exposing the correspondence between Mahmoud Nawajaa, a senior BNC official, who serves as the organization’s general coordinator, and Msallam. In the correspondence, Nawajaa urged Msallam to refrain from appearing in Israel and **even dictated an apology on his behalf**, offering him as an alternative to perform in Jenin. At the end of the day, Msallam ignored the pressure, refused to cancel the performance without compensation and appeared in Haifa.\(^73\)

c. **Shashi Naidoo** – A South African actress and model who in June 2018 expressed support for Israel in her Twitter account.\(^74\) In the wake of the publication of the series of tweets, Naidoo was subjected to extensive pressure from the BDS activists and organizations in South Africa. **Naidoo also received threats to her life following these statements.**\(^75\) In order to minimize the damage caused by the series of tweets and in an attempt to dispel criticism from the BDS organizations, Naidoo was forced to apologize for her statements. In a staged press conference organized by BDS South Africa in the presence of Farid Esack, Chairman of the organization’s Board

---


and Muhammed Desai, CEO and co-founder, Naidoo announced that she was retracting her statements.76

Shashi Naidoo alongside CEO and co-founder of BDS South Africa77

d. **The Pink Floyd Experience UK British cover band** – Prior to its visit to Israel, the BDS organizations and Roger Waters, a close associate of PACBI and a major activist in calls to artists not to perform in Israel, carried out a wide-ranging campaign to cancel the band's performances in Israel, to no avail.78 As part of the cultural terror waged by PACBI and its operatives, the band members phone numbers were published openly, and it was even reported that members of the band received threats against their families.79 The band did not succumb to the cultural terrorism and performed in Israel, but it refrained from performing the songs of Roger Waters.

79 Maariv, January 2019, [https://www.maariv.co.il/culture/music/Article-678515](https://www.maariv.co.il/culture/music/Article-678515).
Key activists in PACBI

• **Omar Barghouti**
  A founding member of PACBI, and head of the global BDS movement. Represents the movement and the organization and frequently serves as their spokesperson in media interviews, conferences and events. Barghouti is the main axis in directing the BDS activity.

• **Hind Awwad**
  Member of the PACBI Steering Committee.\(^8^0\) In the past she served as the BNC National Coordinator.\(^8^1\) In this context she worked against normalization and cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.\(^8^2\)

  She is active in the Canadian branch of the CAIA coalition (Coalition Against Israeli Apartheid), working against Israel.\(^8^3\) She writes and gives interviews on various BDS platforms, primarily the Electronic Intifada website, which promotes the campaign to delegitimize the State of Israel.

• **Samia Botmeh**
  A long-time member of the PACBI Steering Committee.\(^8^4\) Botmeh is also a member of the Boycott Committee of the Palestinian Bir Zeit University's workers union. She led a survey as part of her academic activity on boycotts and opposition to normalization.\(^8^5\)

---


\(^8^2\) The Electronic Intifada website, June 2010, [https://electronicintifada.net/content/palestinian-boycott-coordinator-movement-has-huge-impact/8874](https://electronicintifada.net/content/palestinian-boycott-coordinator-movement-has-huge-impact/8874).


• Haidar Eid

Member of the PACBI Founding Committee and the PACBI Steering Committee. Representative of PACBI and BNC in Gaza. Known in his extreme statements against Israel – "We will bury Zionism sooner or later" (February 2019).

• Sami Hermez

Member of the PACBI Steering Committee. Represented PACBI in media interviews.

• Stephanie Westbrook

PABCI Coordinator. An American living in Rome and active in BDS Italy. She publishes anti-Israeli content on a variety of platforms and has been active in the boycott movement for years.

• Ziyaad Yusuf Lunat

A PACBI activist, and a representative of the organization in the BDS Eurovision Song Contest campaign. He is identified as a member of BDS Europe. A leading activist in the BDS movement.

---

90 [https://electronicintifada.net/content/scholars-italy-debate-israel-boycott-despite-censorship/16306](https://electronicintifada.net/content/scholars-italy-debate-israel-boycott-despite-censorship/16306).
• **Zaid Shuaibi**

PACBI Coordinator with the Arab world and within the Palestinian arena,\(^95\) and Coordinator of BNC activity to the Arab world (2018).\(^96\) Previously served as General Coordinator and Communications Director at BNC.\(^97\) His statements on social media support a violent struggle against Israel.\(^98\) One of his statements: "**Blessed are the hands that fired the Kornet**", referring to the firing of an anti-tank missile by Hamas at an Israeli bus, November 2018.

• **Samir Eskanda**

He is identified with the PACBI activities, serves as spokesperson and represents the organization in key events,\(^99\) interviews on its behalf,\(^100\) and publishes inter-organizational combat strategies and tactics. Eskanda represented the boycott movement's positions with the media in a variety of PACBI campaigns against the arrival of artists to Israel, and is also active in the BDS movement.\(^101\) He is active in London, a musician, former drummer for the "Flats"\(^102\) and member of Artists for Palestine UK.

---

94 The Turkish news agency FHA, undated, [https://filistin.info/israil-boykot-hareketi-bds-nedir/](https://filistin.info/israil-boykot-hareketi-bds-nedir/).
99 From the YouTube channel of the Dutch BDS website DOCP, November 2017, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pFAOfj9caOg](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pFAOfj9caOg).
102 From the Quietus website, March 2011, [https://thequietus.com/articles/05905-flats-interview](https://thequietus.com/articles/05905-flats-interview).
• **Stephanie Adam**

PACBI Coordinator and Spokesperson.\(^{103}\) She represents the organization extensively in the media and is interviewed on different BDS platforms.

• **Aliya Al-Hussain / Malak**

A PACBI activist, a British of Palestinian origin, who is also involved in the campaign against the Eurovision Song Contest;\(^{104}\) Writes and is active in the British organization War on Want,\(^{105}\) which calls for the cessation of military trade between Britain and Israel, supports the right of return, etc. The organizations have personal and ideological ties.

\(^{103}\) The SPIEGEL ONLINE news website: [http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/pro-palestinian-bds-movement-versus-german-culture-festivals-a-1217664.html](http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/pro-palestinian-bds-movement-versus-german-culture-festivals-a-1217664.html).
